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carriers 8 or of places of public amusement.1 9 The courts are more
willing to redress intentional than negligent infliction of mental suffering, because of the natural tendency to extend liability as moral
20
guilt increases.
The principal case, following the majority view that recognizes a
legal interest in a corpse, 2 1 holds that recovery should be allowed for
mental suffering caused by tortious interference with a dead body.
the opinion by dictum 2 2 seeks to enlarge the area of recovery for
mental suffering so as to include all cases based on a tort committed
under circumstances that imply malice or gross indifference to the
rights of others, even in the absence of physical injury. The objection
that such a policy will open the doors to a flood of litigation can best
Holt: "If men will multiply injuries,
be answered in the words of Lord
23
so too must actions multiply."
ISRAEL ABRAHAM

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: WHAT CONSTITUTES INJURY
BY ACCIDENT?
Brooks-Scanlon, Inc. v. Lee, 44 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1950)
In a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act the claimant sought to recover compensation for the death of her husband, an
employee of the defendant. The circuit court, although indicating
that the injury preceded any possible accident, affirmed an order of
the Industrial Commission awarding compensation. On appeal, the
opinion unfortunately omitting the facts, HELD, when an injury causing

' 8 E.g., Louisville & N. R.R. v. Robinson, 213 Ala. 522, 105 So. 874 (1925);
see Shankle v. TriState Transit Co., 8 So.2d 714, 717 (La. App. 1942).
9
1 See Interstate Amusement Co. v. Martin, 8 Ala. App. 481, 484. 62 So. 404,
405 (1913); Odom v. East Ave. Corp., supra note 17 at 366, 34 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
20
See Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37
MICH. L. REv. 874, 878 (1939).
21
E.g., Rivers v. Greenwood Cemetery, 194 Ga. 524, 23 S E.2d 134 (1942),
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Burton, 104 Ind. App. 576, 12 N.E.2d .360 (1938). Larsor
v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891).
22
Page 189 of the opinion.
23Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 955, 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 1:37 (K.B. 1703).
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the death of an employee is not preceded by an accident, the employee's widow is not entitled to an award under the Workmen's Compensation Law. Judgment reversed, Justice Chapman disse nting.
The worknen's compensation laws of most states do not authorize
recovery unless the injury is accidental;' and even in the absence
of express statutory wording several jurisdictions have construed the
term "injury" to mean injury by accident.2 In determining the meaning
of "accident," the courts have frequently been confronted, directly
or impliedly, with the question of whether the injury itself can be
deemed the accident. 3 The early cases refused to classify an injury
as an accident unless it was caused by some specific, unexpected
external influence.4 More recently the view that the injury itself may
constitute the accident has been advanced, 5 although some jurisdictions adhere to the older construction of the compensation acts. 6
This issue arises not only in the instant case but also in Peterson v.
City Commission,7 recently decided, and in Travelers Insurance Co.
v. Shepard.8 The rule is said to be the same as that of Tallahassee v.
lE.g.,

ALA. CODE ANN.

COLO.
(1947);
2

tit. 26, §253 (1940); ARK.

STAT. ANN.

c. 97, §294 (1935);

STAT. ANN. tit. 81,

FLA. STAT.

§1302(f)

§440.02(6) (1949).

Pucilowski v. Packard Motor Car Co., 278 Mich. 240, 270 N.W. 282 (1936);
Nicholson v. Roundup Coal Mining Co., 79 Mont. 858, 257 Pac. 270 (1927);
Guay v. Brown Co., 83 N.H. 392, 142 AtI. 697 (1928). Contra: Ahnquist v.
Shenandoah Nurseries, 218 Iowa 724, 254 N.W. 35 (1934); In re Madden, 222
Mass. 487, 111 N.E. 379 (1916).
3
See notes 4, 5, and 6 infra.
4
E.g., Southard v. Railway Passengers Assur. Co., 34 Conn. 574 (1868);
Crews v. Moseley Bros., 148 Va. 125, 138 S.E. 494 (1927).
5
E.g., United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Industrial Comm'n of Colo.,
96 Colo. 571, 45 P.2d 895 (1935); Studebaker Corp. v. Jones, 104 Ind. App.
270, 10 N.E.2d 747 (1937); Moore v. Rumford Printing Co., 88 N.H. 134,
185 Aft. 165 (1936); Ciguere v. E. B. & A. C. Whiting Co., 107 Vt. 151, 177
AUt. 313 (1935); 4 SCHNEIDER, WornaxaN's COMPENSATION LAW 384 (3d ed.
1945).
GE.g., Twork v. Munising Paper Co., 275 Mich. 174, 266 N.V. 311 (1936);
State ex rel. Hussmann-Ligonier Co. v. Hughes, 348 Mo. 319, 153 S.W.2d 40
(1941).
744 So.2d 423 (Fla. 1950) (Claimant's knee "snapped" when he bent down
in the usual manner to clean or change a burner on a boiler; denial of compensation was affirmed).
8155 Fla. 576, 20 So.2d 903 (1945) (rash on hands of claimant citrus
packer, diagnosed as dermatitis due to oil from oranges, held insufficient as
basis for compensation, there being no unexpected or unusual event).
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Roberts9 and Cleary Brothers ConstructionCo. v. Nobles. 10 The reason
for denying compensation in the latter case, however, was lack of
proof that the employee had exerted himself in a way uncommon to
the type of work he was accustomed to do, coupled with the further
fact - probably more impressive to the Court - that his subnormal
physical condition was such as to occasion injury in the event of any
exertion whatsoever. Similarly, the Roberts case, relied upon in the
Peterson case, may be distinguished on its facts in that the injury there
involved was in all probability not caused by the employment; the
claimant had sought medical aid for the same ailment two days before
the date of the alleged injury. The Peterson case may be disposed of
on the same ground, namely, the lack of causal connection between
the employment and the injury.
Conceptually, there are several types of injury, not self-inflicted and
not occasioned by what might be termed deliberate contributory
negligence,'1 that may occur in connection with employment. One
type is directly produced by a single, specific event that is itself
abnormal and unexpected. Another, usually known as the occupational
disease, customarily results from long-continued work of a certain
character; and although it cannot be traced to any single or unusual
occurrence it is normally to be expected over a long period of such
work. 12 Still another class of injury arises when one is doing his usual
work in the usual manner, and the injury itself is not normal for such
type of work but does occur suddenly and at a definitely ascertained
time. Finally, there is the injury, unusual to the type of work being
performed, that cannot be traced to any specific event or time but
that nevertheless is first noticed during a given period of employment.
Only the third and fourth types are involved in this comment; confusion of the two has resulted in conflicting decisions and extreme
statements of principle.
The Florida Workmen's Compensation Law defines injury as
personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course
of employment . . . ."x Accident is in turn defined as "...
only an
9155 Fla. 815, 21 So.2d 712 (1945).
10156 Fla. 408, 23 So.2d 525 (1945).
11 FLA. STAT. §440.09(3) (1949) rules out injuries intentionally inflicted
by the employee on himself, those occasioned primarily by his intoxication, and
those due to wilful refusal to use a safety appliance or to observe a safety rule.
1-FL.. STAT. §§440.151-440.152 (1949).
3
1 FLA. STAT. §440.02(6) (1949).
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unexpected or unusual event, happening suddenly." 4 In the principal
case the Court stated emphatically:' 5
".... to authorize an award there must be an accident preceding
the injury. In other words, the injury itself cannot suffice for, or
constitute, the accident."
The major problem lies in the requirement of causal connection
between injury and employment, taking in conjunction with the
virtual impossibility of demonstrating the lack of such connection if
as a matter of law the mere discovery of an injury while one is employed were to be held sufficient in itself to establish injury "arising
out of and in the course of employment." No such procedural springboard can be found among the presumptions created by statute.' 6 To
provide it would open the door to all sorts of groundless claims; an
individual could readily sustain a minor injury, then secure employment, and at some time thereafter "notice" the injury, allegedly for
the first time. The employer would thereupon be placed in the impossible position of discovering and proving the true cause of the
injury. From this it follows that an injury "... . that may proceed from
an unknown cause.. ."17 should not be compensable when the cause is
really unknown; this very language admits that the requisite causal
connection is not established. It does not follow, however, that "..
the unusual effect of a known cause..." 1 8 is beyond compensability.
There are several situations in which the Florida Supreme Court has
allowed recovery for injury not preceded by a separate and distinct
accident. In hernia cases, for example, in which very strict requirements of proof are specially prescribed,19 the Court has specifically
rejected the contention that the hernia must be traced to a specific
separate and unusual event such as slipping, falling, or some similar
mishap; 20 strain occurring in the ordinary line of duty can serve as
14FLA. STAT.

§440.02(19) (1949).

15At p. 650.

' 0 These presumptions appear in FLA. STAT. §440.26 (1949).
17The Georgia interpretation of a similar provision, as paraphrased in the
dissent of Chapman, J., in Peterson v. City Comm'n, 44 So.2d 42, 426 (Fla.
1950).
lIsbid.
19 FLA. STAT. §440.15(6) (1949).
20Duff Hotel Co. v. Ficara, 150 Fla. 442, 7 So.2d 790 (1942).
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a basis for recovery, provided causal connection is established.2' Another instance in which the Court has not required a literal showing
of accident is employment involving at the time of injury working
conditions inherently conducive to it. Liability under our Workmen's
Compensation Law has been recognized in this situation without
proof of accident when the facts of record indicate plainly that the
injury is due to exposure to such conditions."2
In ruling that any injury coming under the Act must be caused by
a separate and distinct event, the Florida Court stands apart from the
majority of jurisdictions. 23 Furthermore, this view does not accord
with the judicially recognized policy of our Workmen's Compensation
Law: injuries caused by industry should be charged to expenses of
production and borne directly by the employer and ultimately by the
consumer through an increase in commodity prices.24 The statute does
not purport, of course, to make the employer an absolute insurer of
his employees' well-being;2 5 the claimant must prove not only that
he was working within the scope of his employment when the injury
occurred but also that it arose out of that employment. It may well
be, as some of the language in the opinion indicates, that the Court
was merely insisting on proof of these requisites and was refusing to
accept unconnected injury alone as proof. On this basis the decision
is sound. It is unfortunate, however, that the rule was stated so
broadly as to require a specific accident prior to injury; the causal
connection required by statute might be established in some other
manner in at least some cases. If the rule as stated in the instant
opinion is limited to those instances in which the injury is not shown
to have arisen out of the employment, it will conform to the language
of the statute and yet, even without a separate unexpected event,
2l1bid; Atlantic Marine Boat Yard, Inc. v. Daniel, 138 Fla. 864, 190 So. 612
(1939); cf. General Properties Co. v. Greening, 154 Fla. 814, 18 So.2d 9O.
(1944).
2
Meehan v. Crowder, 158 Fla. 361, 28 So.2d 435 (1946); Davis %.Aitl
Constr. Co., 154 Fla. 481, 18 So.2d 255 (1944); Alexander Orr, Jr. Inc. x.
Florida Ind. Comm'n, 129 Fla. 369, 176 So. 172 (1937).
23

See note 5 supra.
- 4See, e.g., General Properties Co. v. Greening, 154 Fla. 814. 820, 18 So.2d
908, 911 (1944); Protectu Awning Shutter Co. v. Cline, 154 Fla. 30, 31, 16
So.2d 342, 343 (1944).
25This is conceded, for example, even in the strong dissent of Chapman, J..
in Peterson v. City Comm'n, 44 So.2d 423, 425 (Fla. 1950).
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